Does new trade theory support government intervention and strategic trade policy?

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Abstract

Recent developments in trade theory - the result of applying modelsthat embody imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale - suggest an activist role for government in trade policy and threaten to undermine the case for trade liberalization. But the new modelling of international trade lacks theoretical robustness. It is particularly sensitive to assumptions about competitive behavior and the number of firms. Economists'criticism also focuses on the size of the excess profits that oligopolistic firms are alleged to earn, the partial equilibrium nature of the analysis, and the identification of the market failure and the choice of instrument. The normative prescriptions that arise from the new trade theory are also criticized in terms of political economy issues: the potential for foreign retaliation, inefficient government intervention, special interests'capture of policy, the problem of moral hazard, and possibly inimical redistributive effects. The limits of the new trade theory are particularly acute for developing countries because of their small economies, their limited ability to shift profits, the nature of their trade, and the greater chance for special interests to capture trade policy. Paradoxically, empirical work has shown that the gains from trade are much bigger under imperfectly competitive markets which actually strengthens the case for trade liberalization.

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References listed on IDEAS

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These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.

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What are the main ideas of new trade theory?

New trade theory (NTT) is a collection of economic models in international trade theory which focuses on the role of increasing returns to scale and network effects, which were originally developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Which of these trade theories support the idea of government involvement in trade?

Mercantilists believed that governments should promote exports and that governments should control economic activity and place restrictions on imports if needed to ensure an export surplus.

What does the new trade theory state?

New Trade Theory (NTT) is an economic theory that was developed in the 1970s as a way to predict international trade patterns. It explains why, even if a good or service is produced in our country, we end up with comparable products from other countries.

What are limitations of new trade theory?

The normative prescriptions that arise from the new trade theory are also criticized in terms of political economy issues: the potential for foreign retaliation, inefficient government intervention, special interests'capture of policy, the problem of moral hazard, and possibly inimical redistributive effects.