Which of the following best explains the purpose of the persian gulf war?

Anarchy produces a structural imperative of self-help, which inclines states to be concerned about the balance of power—who has it and who is likely to use it. On the "who has it" side of the equation, countries evaluate each others' power and seek to counter that power when it appears overwhelming. On the "who is likely to use it" side—known as balance of threat—states balance against countries that not only have the offensive capability to act but also reveal aggressive intentions. It is not merely the most powerful state that countries balance against, but also the most threatening.

A Third Lens focus on balance of power (threat) offers an explanation for why the coalition formed, why the United States decided to limit the conflict with Iraq, and why Iraq chose to resist.

Balancing toward Coalition: Strange Bedfellows

The coalition that eventually emerged against Iraq was composed of states with very different forms of government, religions, economies, domestic politics, and types of governments. Prior to the invasion, many of the coalition members were not on friendly terms. Syria, for example, had routinely been placed on the U.S. State Department's list of countries that sponsored terrorism, which meant that Washington placed economic sanctions on Damascus. Yet despite such differences, coalition members found a common interest in opposing Iraq.

Taking control of Kuwait would have given Iraq (which had the fourth largest land army in the world) control over 20 percent of the world's oil reserves; as it was, Iraq's military was on the doorstep of Saudi Arabia's vast oil resources. Almost all of the states in the region sought balance by forming an alliance that could protect them against Iraq. (Jordan being a complicated exception, see Harknett, Richard, and Jeffrey VanDenBerg, "Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats," Security Studies 6 (3): pp. 112–153.) The one willing ally of all was the United States.

For Arab states to form a coalition with the United States against another Arab state must be viewed as an extraordinary example of balance-of-power politics. The fact that the United States was Israel's strongest supporter meant that the Arab default was not to side with the United States. Most Arab countries were concerned geopolitically about the U.S.-Israeli power and influence. Beyond that there was also a wariness about the United States becoming too influential regionally. Yet despite cultural, political, and religious differences, Arab, Muslim, monarchies, and authoritarian states joined an alliance led by an Anglo-Saxon Judeo-Christian democracy. The reaction to Iraq's invasion was uniformly to balance. Within days, U.S. and British troops were bolstering Saudi, Egyptian, and Syrian forces.

Balancing Despite Different Agendas

While there was a general dynamic of balancing unleashed, the motivation behind each country's decision to balance varied. Saudi Arabia faced a threat of military invasion. Although Iraq claimed that it had no intention of attacking, by 4 August 1990, it had the ability to move largely unopposed into Saudi oil fields. So, Saudi Arabia received U.S. covering forces almost immediately, signaling a broader U.S. commitment in hopes that such a commitment would deter immediate Iraqi action. By November, sufficient forces from its partners had arrived to make defense of Saudi Arabia possible—i.e. balancing against threat.

But Iraq's movement south did not threaten Egypt or Syria militarily. Why did Presidents Mubarak and Assad, respectively, respond so readily? Here, the long-term regional balance of power offers a good explanation. If Iraq had occupied Kuwait without opposition, Iraq would have gained access to new and significant oil revenues, which it would have used to rebuild its economy and military. With military forces dangerously close to Saudi oil fields, Iraq would have been able to intimidate the Saudi royal family and gain greater influence over oil production rates and thus the price of oil. With its newfound power, Iraq could have become the dominant state in the region.

A Second Lens view of Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt would reveal subtle political and religious differences between these countries and Iraq that might have seeded anti-Iraq policies. For example, Syrian Baathists had always viewed the Iraqi Baath Party as a regional rival and Hussein's view of himself as heir to Nasser's leadership on Arab Nationalism irritated Egyptian politicians, who viewed Egypt as the political leader of the Arab world. However, these differences were long-standing and had never on their own pushed these states into open support of the United States in the region. It is the shift in the regional balance of power that best explains the decision made throughout the region to align with the United States to balance Iraq.

For the United States, the regional balance of power was an important factor in its decision to oppose Iraq. In the late 1970s in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration had designated the Persian Gulf a vital national interest. Military plans to defend Saudi Arabia and other states in the region were developed at that time. Those plans served as a basis for Desert Shield (the military action to defend Saudi Arabia) and Desert Storm (the campaign to drive Iraq out of Kuwait) and provided a historical context for U.S. involvement. But, the decision to use U.S. might to balance Iraq was, as with the decisions of the Arab states, not ordained by previous political stands. In fact, throughout much of the Iran-Iraq war, the United States had supported Iraq, and on the eve of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States had conveyed its desire to have better relations with Iraq.

On the day after the invasion, however, President Bush's National Security Council met and focused quickly on the CIA's conclusion that, left unopposed, Iraq would threaten both the stability of several Middle Eastern states and the price of oil. The United States determined that Iraq should not become the preeminent power in the region. The coalition was formed to oppose the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait both from a sense of imminent threat and future power potential. With the coalition in place, the question for the United States was how to use this force effectively.

Unlimited Power, Limited Aims

Once constituted, the coalition was an effective counterweight to any further Iraqi offensive action. By the end of 1990, Saudi Arabia and the other Persian Gulf states were secure. Simply� maintaining a U.S. military presence did not restore the regional balance (and would not have been acceptable to some coalition partners over the long term), which the Kuwait invasion had upset. Although Kuwait was a relatively small state, it was influential in and in the global oil market. Restoring independence to Kuwait was important to restoring the regional balance. Thus defense of Saudi Arabia was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for restoring some equilibrium. For equilibrium to be restored, Iraq had to leave Kuwait.

From the outset, the United States seemed to focus on this limited objective. There were two very practical reasons for focusing on restoring Kuwait, rather than destroying Saddam Hussein's regime. First, restoring Kuwait was all the Arab coalition members would agree to. In fact, once the war began, Saudi Arabia and Egypt announced publically that their troops would not cross into Iraqi territory. It would have been difficult for the United States to prosecute a war if its rear basing area in Saudi Arabia was no longer was accessible. Second, (and more directly related to the balance of power rather than military tactics) was the U.S. determination that stability in Iraq was essential to the regional balance. The United States was concerned that Iran and Syria would both try to take advantage of a power vacuum left by destroying the Hussein regime. That the United States never envisioned itself occupying Iraq or overthrowing its regime is made clear in a secret National Security Directive signed by President Bush as operations commenced against Iraq. This directive propounds a clear, balance-of-power logic that focuses on restoring equilibrium as its general policy goal.

If war is chosen as the means by which to create balance (and keep in mind that there are other means short of war, such as creating alliances, increasing domestic arms production, and negotiating settlements), the goal of equilibrium places a constraint on how the war can be prosecuted. Balance-of-power warfare tends to have the limited objective ofrestoring balance and thus tends to be fought in a limited fashion. The logic behind this limitation rests on conceiving of international relations in the context of regional and global systems. For example, in a regional system of five states, if one state grows so powerful that it threatens the others, destroying that fifth state would actually destablize the overall regional balance—a new system organized around fewer important states would have to be established. To redraw borders so as to eliminate the power of the fifth state would require an extraordinary effort (total war, meaning the complete defeat and occupation of the enemy state as well as its management after the war). Balance-of-power war falls short of this effort. The classic example is the manner in which the victorious coalition against Napoleonic France dealt with the European balance of power. France in the early 1800s under Napoleon threatened all the rest of Europe. Russia, Great Britain, Austria, and later Prussia joined together to defeat Napoleon, but in defeat forced France simply to accept its previous pre–Napoleonic borders. France was an important state in the overall European balance of power. The goal was to restore it to its "proper" place. This balance-of-power settlement ushered in an era of stability in Europe. The logic of limitation can be understood in terms of a scale. To achieve balance, you don't eliminate the weight entirely the one side; instead you reduce weight on one scale until balance occurs. In fact, doing so destroys any change at finding equilibrium.

A look through the Third Lens at the Persian Gulf Crisis reveals that the United States locked itself into maintaining Iraq as a player in the region—albeit one with reduced power and chastened leadership and that clear limit on the scale and scope of fighting may have increased the likelihood of war.

Iraq's Limited Gamble

Facing the combined military might of the U.N. coalition and the prospect of economic sanctions, Hussein should have thought twice about flouting the U.N. resolutions and remaining in Kuwait. However, balance of power may explain why Iraq chose to fight rather than walk away. If the Hussein regime recognized that the coalition's goal was to restore the balance of power in the region, the Iraqi leadership may have been able to surmise that the most likely military outcome was a limited defeat of its forces in Kuwait. In fact, throughout the fall of 1990, Hussein could easily have come to understand that the military force arrayed against him would not topple him from power. United Nations resolutions, Soviet diplomacy, and Arab government statements all implied that Iraqi removal from Kuwait was the sole objective. If Iraqi policy was not motivated by Saddam Hussein's desire to remain in power, Iraqi defiance may have reflected a calculation that focused more on internal than external threats. Hussein may have calculated that retreat from Kuwait solely under threat of sanctions might have inspired a coup. This would have been more of a central threat to Hussein personally than would be losing a limited conflict, which could be presented as a defiant resistance against the all-powerful United States.

On 5 January 1991 President Bush wrote a letter directly to Saddam Hussein read by Foreign Minister Aziz at a meeting on 9 January and presumably conveyed to the Iraqi president. The carefully worded letter essentially confirmed that Hussein could expect a limited military response. Bush wrote that he wished to

eliminate any uncertainty or ambiguity that might exist in your mind about where we stand and what we are prepared to do. The international community is united in its call for Iraq to leave all of Kuwait without condition and without further delay.
(http://www.wwnorton.com/lenses/demo_bush_letter.htm)

In a distinctive paragraph later in the letter, Bush stressed

that the United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons. . . . you will be held directly responsible for terrorist actions against any member of the coalition. The American people would demand the strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable acts of this sort.
(http://www.wwnorton.com/lenses/demo_bush_letter.htm)

It must be assumed that on the eve of war this diplomatic correspondence was written with great precision. Read carefully, it seems clear that the message told the Iraqi leadership that if certain lines were crossed (i.e., if weapons of mass destruction were used) the United States would respond wrathfully. By implication, however, this message (which was probably sent with the protection of Israel in mind), suggested that if the line was not crossed, the United States would limit the war. Interestingly, Bush stressed that Saddam himself would be held responsible for "unconscionable acts"—possibly implying a threat to his regime—but does not personalize the threat when discussing the liberation of Kuwait. In those paragraphs, Bush speaks about how resistance to the United Nations will hurt Iraq in general.

While the United States did attack Hussein residences with cruise missiles and did attempt to coordinate opposition groups, the threat to roll the Iraqi army back to Baghdad, destroy the regime, and occupy the country was never put on the table by the coalition because of the balance-of-power imperative.

While Iraq could have surmised that it faced only a limited military defeat, could the institutional context of the United Nations have played a role in the Iraqi decision to resist and the U.S. decision to attack?

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